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Abstract 
The study has tried to find out the key parameters through which a non-bank financial institution can embellish its 
earnings. The study has found that loan loss provisions increases in line with the increase in loan and advances and 
interest suspense. Moreover, non-bank financial institutions always report other assets except accounts receivable figure 
which foreshadows an existence of deliberate inflation of earnings. The study has found a positive impact of total loan 
loss provisions and interest suspense on accrued income, a clear message that non-bank financial institutions always 
report more accrued earnings to safeguard their profit. Increase in accrued income in line with total loan loss provision 
and interest suspense is also validated by increase in accrued income with respect to other assets except accounts 
receivable figure even though the impact of other assets on accrued income is insignificant at 5% level, an accounting 
channel through which excess other assets except accounts receivable would be inflated for excess increase in accrued 
income. The study has deduced that other assets except accounts receivable is a reserve bank for discretionary inflation 
of earnings even though it is insignificant. The study has used time series monthly data of International Leasing and 
Financial Services Limited, a non-bank financial institution from 2009-2015 reported in the Statement of NBDC sent to 
Bangladesh Bank each month. Two-time series models have been used in this study. The first model has tried to find out 
the impact of loan and advances, interest suspense, and other assets except accounts receivable on total loan loss 
provision. In the first model, there is a significant impact of loan and advances, interest suspense, and other assets 
except accounts receivable on total loan loss provision. The second model has tried to discern the impact of total loan 
loss provision, interest suspense, and other assets on accrued income along with other independent variables 
namely-loan and advances, total fixed assets, and operating income. The study has found a significant positive impact of 
total loan loss provision and interest suspense on accrued income and insignificant impact of other assets except 
accounts receivable on accrued income. For both models, there is no long-run relationship among the variables. 
Keywords: non-bank financial institutions, earnings, loan-loss provision, loan and advances, other assets except 
accounts receivable, total fixed assets, operating income, statement of NBDC, and Bangladesh bank 
JEL Classification: C01, C12, C13, and C32 
1. Introduction 
Earning, occasionally called “the bottom line” or “net income”, is the single most vital item in financial statements. 
They include the extent to which a company has engaged in value-added activities. They work as a signal that helps 
direct resource allocation in capital markets. In fact, theoretical value of a company’s stock is the present value of its 
future earnings. Increased earnings represent an increase in company value, while decreased earnings signal a decrease 
in that value
1
. Given the importance of earnings, it is no surprise that company management has a vital interest in how 
they are reported. A company can manage its earnings in two ways- legal earnings management and illegal earnings 
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management. Legal earnings management may be defined as reasonable and legal management decision making and 
reporting to achieve stable and predictable financial results. Legal earnings management should not be confused with 
illegal way of earnings management. Even though earning management is not always bad, illegal way of managing 
earning to deceive shareholders is not acceptable. Many authors have come into the conclusion that companies usually 
manage earnings to cover their poor performance and deceive investors and stakeholders (bondholders). Managers also 
manage earnings to increase their incentive, a case of agency conflict. Schipper (1989) defined earnings management as 
"...a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain 
(as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process)." Managers may manage earnings for the 
contractual outcomes also. Healy and Wahlen (1999) said: "Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment 
in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about 
the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers." While most corporate executives respect investors and shareowners and report in accordance with 
the standards, there is always the risk that some executives might misrepresent financial data for achieving contractual 
outcomes (Kellogg, 1991). 
An extreme form of earnings management, fraudulent earnings management, is well defined as: “the intentional, 
deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting data, which is misleading and, when considered 
with all the information made available, would cause the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or decision. 
(National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 1993). Callao and Jarne (2010) argued that accounting standards 
can restrain managers’ ability to misrepresent accounting numbers. Where inflexible and rigid accounting rules that 
offer limited accounting options can restrict the scope for subjective judgments, which can in turn constrain managers’ 
ability to behave opportunistically. Many executives face a lot of pressure to deliberately manage earnings. “A 1998 
survey at a conference sponsored by CFO Magazine found that 78 percent of the Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in 
attendance had been asked to cast financial results in a better light, though still using Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). Half of them complied with the request. However, 45 percent of the group attendees reported that 
they had been asked to misrepresent their financial results- and 38 percent admit with complying. The intense pressure 
to report better earnings was confirmed by a similar survey at a Business Week CFO conference. It has been found that 
55 percent of the CFOs had been asked to misrepresent financial results, and 17 percent had complied”2. The agency 
concept stresses the complexities that can arise under conditions of asymmetric and incomplete information, between 
the principal and the agent. As it can result in agency concerns, which are namely issues that occurs when these two 
parties, have different interests. In this context, agents may have incentives to undertake actions and make decisions that 
are not in line with owners’ interests, when preparing the financial information (Fama, 1980; Fama& Jensen, 1983). 
Banks and other financial institutions are often excluded from earnings management research because their 
characteristics differ fundamentally from other firms (Peasnellet al., 2000). To mention a few authors, Meisel (2013), 
Duru and Tsitinidis (2013), Ahmed et al. (1999), Anandarajanet al. (2007), Bhat (1996), Barth et al. (1995), Beatty et al. 
(1995), Kim and Kross (1998), Moyer (1990), Beaver et al. (1989), Scholes et al. (1990), Wahlen (1994), Beaver and 
Engel (1996), and Liu and Ryan (2006) etc. have conducted research on earning management in financial companies 
like banks. This study has tried to detect deliberate earning management in financial sector especially in non-bank 
financial institutions by addressing two key issues-whether increase in loan and advances and interest suspense 
increases the total loan loss provision? And whether increases in total loan loss provision and interest suspense 
increases the accrued interest income? It is very common that the financial institution may compensate the excess 
provision and interest suspense by reporting higher accrued interest income. It may be true that the company may 
increase the other assets except accounts receivable figure to report more accrued interest income. To be ensured 
whether increase in other assets except accounts receivable figure increase the accrued income, the second model has 
been used. Conclusion has been drawn based on GLS results. In the model development section, justification has been 
given behind the development of the models. 
2. Objectives, Methodologies, Limitations, and Rationale of the Study 
2.1 Objectives of the Study 
This study has tried to answer a few questions- whether deliberate earnings management presents in financial sector 
comprising non-bank financial institutions or not? Whether totals loan loss provision increases with respect to increase 
in loan and advances and interest suspense? How firms may report better bottom line even though it has high loan loss 
provision and interest suspense? Whether a firm increases the other assets figure except accounts receivable (as reserve 
bank) with respect to increase in accrued interest income? This study attempts to identify a new way of deliberate 
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earnings management in non-bank financial institutions that has not attracted too much attention before in Bangladesh. 
Hence, from the perspective of non-bank financial institutions, this paper is an excellent contribution in a new way of 
deliberately managing earnings. 
2.2 Methodologies and Limitations of the Study 
The study is completely based on quantitative research methods-OLS and GLS. Since time series data set has been used, 
stationary checking has been performed by using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test with and without trend. The 
study has also checked – whether long- run relationship exists among the financial variables. There is no long-run 
relationship among the variables. Hence, causality has not been checked even though time series data have been used. 
After diagnostic tests (namely auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity) in OLS, the GLS result has been used for final 
conclusion and decision making. 
As the study is completely based on time series data of a single non-bank financial institution - International Leasing 
And Financial Services Limited (Inductive Research) enlisted in Dhaka and Chittagong Stock Exchange, it is very 
tough to generalize the results into the entire financial sector comprising non-bank financial institutions. Also the results 
generated from the two models will only remain in the short run. Therefore, considering the long term prospects, the 
result may be insignificant for long-term planning and decision making. Due to lack of data, monthly data have been 
used. 
2.3 Rationale of the Study 
As a large contributing sector to the GDP of Bangladesh, financial sector carries more importance and prioritization. 
From 2000 to 2009, financial sector’s non-performing loan to total loan and advances ratio was excessively larger than 
financial sector’s capital to assets ratio. Even though financial sector’s poor performance (having higher 
non-performing loan to total loan and advances ratio than capital to assets ratio), financial sector experienced some 
profit margin (Net profit to total loan and advances ratio).  
Therefore, a question automatically comes in that, whether financial sector actually is receiving profit or loss or simply 
reporting high profit? 
Since Bangladesh as a developing country lies in frontier economies domain (possessing weak legal system, politically 
manipulated market, and low per capita income), the flow of information financial sector is not that much smooth 
between the concerned parties unlike the developed countries. As a result a common concern usually arises, whether the 
depositors providing mainstream funding source to the financial sector consisting of banks and non-bank financial 
institutions are getting the actual scenario of financial sector performance?  
This study has tried to answer whether financial sector is reporting actual profit or simply boosting its bottom line. 
The mean non-performing loan (NPL) to total loan and advances from 2000 to 2004 is 26.82% (Source: Bangladesh 
Bank) and from 2005 to 2009 is 13.56% (Source: Bangladesh Bank). The mean capital to assets ratio from 2000 to 2004 
is 3.72% (Source: Bangladesh Bank) and from 2005 to 2009 is 5.51% (Source: Bangladesh Bank). Both scenarios are 
getting improved gradually. The question is -is it truly happening in the financial sector consisting of non-bank financial 
institutions? Profit to total loan and advances ratio is getting improved gradually. In fact, there is accelerating growth in 
profit to total loan and advances ratio from 2000 to 2009. The average growth rate of non-performing loan from 
2006-2013 is 12.50% (Source: Bangladesh Bank), average growth rate of net profit from 2006 to 2013 is 18% (Source: 
Bangladesh Bank), and average growth rate of total loan and advances is 17.8% from 2006-2013 (Source: Bangladesh 
Bank). Here it is clear that total loan and advances are increasing at a higher rate than non-performing loan. The reason 
behind it might be financial institutions are lending at an increasing rate to highlight lower non-performing loan to total 
loan and advances ratio. Another reason behind the study is that the relationship found among NPL and profitability is 
mixed. Tsai and Huang (1999) examined the relationship between management quality and cost efficiency within 
Taiwan’s banking industry. They discovered that asset quality and cost efficiency are related; the non-value-added 
activities of bad assets incur a negative consequence on the operating performance. However, Fan and Shaffer (2004) 
analyzed profit efficiency of large commercial banks in the U.S. by accounting for non-performing loans. They found 
that, although non-performing loans are negatively related to banks’ profit efficiency, it is not statistically significant. 
Vatansever and Hepsen (2013) showed that the Return on Assets has positive impact on NPL. Kithinji (2010) found that 
bulk of profits of commercial banks are not influenced by the NPL.As a key sector to contribute in GDP, this study will 
also reveal whether financial sector is deliberately working to overstate the GDP or not. This study will also help the 
regulators, to rigidly monitor the entire financial system so that true and fair information could be provided to the 
stake-holders (mainly the depositors).  
Another two crucial reasons to conduct this study are non-bank financial institutions usually collect deposits from 
public. Therefore, financial institutions deal with public money. If a financial institution having poor financial 
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performance reports extraordinary performance to stakeholders (mainly depositors) to collect deposit, it may question 
the financial position of that institutions and increase financial distress in the long run and it was generally observed that 
undesirable banking practices such as poor risk diversification, inadequate loan evaluation, fraudulent activities were as 
much responsible as other macroeconomic factors in causing baking crises that shook the financial systems of nations 
(Arun and Reaz, 2005). 
3. Review of Literatures 
A number of studies have been found on earnings management conducted on financial and non- financial sectors. As for 
example, banks can use accruals to manage their earnings (e.g., Beaver et al., 1989; Moyer, 1990; Scholes et al., 1990; 
Wahlen, 1994; Beatty et. al, 1995; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Kim and Kross, 1998; Liu and Ryan, 2006). Loan loss 
provision is a common accrual item for financial companies. For classified loans, it is inevitable to keep provision. 
Beaver et al. (1996) and Labo and Yang (1996) found that loan-loss provisions are used mainly in three types of 
discretional practices-to smooth income, to manage capital, and to signal financial strength. 
Therefore, due to existence of loan loss provision, the company may use it as earnings management tool. Researchers 
found the mixed results whether loan loss provision is used as a earnings management tool. For example, Greenawalt 
and Sinkey (1988), Wahlen (1994), Laeven and Majnoni (2003), and Liu and Ryan (2006) found that when earnings are 
unusually high, banks can choose discretionary earnings-reducing loan loss provision whereas when earnings are 
unusually low loan loss provision can be deliberately understated or loan loss allowances can be released to offset 
operational losses. In studies by Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) and Ma (1988) it was concluded that banks used loan 
loss provision as long-term mechanisms to smooth earnings. In these studies, total loan loss provision was used as the 
dependent variable. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) focused on the behaviour of loan loss provision as a function of 
banks’ income and other measures of business conditions that are likely to affect the quality of loan portfolios. Ma 
(1988) showed that loan loss provision is actually not strongly related to the actual quality of loan portfolios, but that 
management tends to raise loan loss provision in periods of high operating income and vice versa.  
There are also studies that found evidence that banks do not use loan loss provision as an earnings management tool. 
These studies have been conducted by Wetmore and Brick (1994), Beatty et al. (1995), and Ahmed et al. (1999). Beatty 
et al. (1995) found only a small statistic relation between earnings and loan-loss provision, providing virtually no 
evidence that loan loss provisions are used to manage earnings. Ahmed et al. (1999) found that earnings management is 
not an important driver of loan loss provisions, but that loan loss provisions reflect meaningful changes in the expected 
quality of banks’ loan portfolios. Anandarajan et al. (2005) concluded that the results of the different studies on 
earnings management through manipulation of loan loss provision are conflicting. In this regard, Fonseca and González 
(2008) provide a panel study of 40 countries (excluding the United States) and find that neither the amount of income 
smoothing using loan loss provisions nor the difference in income smoothing using loan loss provisions between public 
and private banks is stable across countries. Kim and Kross (1998), Ahmed et al.(1999), and Bikker and Metzemakers 
(2005) found that banks keep higher provisioning when capital is low indicating capital and provisions are substitutable. 
However, some studies (Davis and Zhu, 2009; Craig et al., 2006; Bishop, 1996; Collins et al., 1995) fail to find a link 
between bank capitalization and loan loss provisioning.  
Since loan loss provision behavior is subject of substantial debate in current banking literatures (Koch and Wall, 2000 
and Benston and Wall, 2005) and Still no one has studied whether financial institutions specially non-bank financial 
institutions are deliberately overstating accrued income for increase in loan loss provision and they are keeping those 
accruals in the other assets figure (an accounting channel through which other assets would be debited for the opposite 
credit entry of the accrued income). This study has tried to justify the overstatement in accrued income as a result of the 
increase in total loan loss provision by the increase of total loan and advances (in the first model) by subsequently using 
a second model where the second model will show increase in total loan loss provision will increase the accrued income 
to protect the consistently stable bottom line (the net income or earnings). The study has been conducted on non-bank 
financial institutions for the first time in Bangladesh. Traditional econometric tools and techniques namely OLS and 
GLS have been used in this study. This study attempts to identify a new way of deliberate earnings management in 
non-bank financial institutions that has not attracted too much attention before in Bangladesh. Hence, from the 
perspective of non-bank financial institutions, this paper is an excellent contribution in a new way of deliberately 
managing earnings. 
4. Formulation of Hypotheses, Development of Model, and Defining the Variables 
Healy (1985) and De Angelo (1986) were the pioneering scholars in earnings management literature. However, the 
biggest impact in this field belongs to Jones (1991). Her model has been changed with some modifications by the 
descending studies such as modified Jones model of Dechowet al. (1995), and performance matched discretionary 
accrual model of Kothari et al. (2005). Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that these models use aggregate accruals 
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approach, meaning that they try to test earnings management over total accruals. These studies generally focused on 
non-financial companies and industries. It should be kept in mind that the nature of financial companies is completely 
different from non-financial companies. The revenue generating assets of financial companies are different from those 
of nonfinancial companies. For example, the key revenue generating assets in financial companies are loan and 
advances where property, plant, and equipment are the key revenue generating assets in non-financial companies. It is 
notable that financial companies are vulnerable to the key changes in macro-economic variables. Therefore, financial 
companies always try to manage earning in a stable level. 
Several studies found conclusive evidence that loan loss provisions are used for managing earnings (Greenawalt and 
Sinkey, 1988; Wahlen, 1994, Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Liu and Ryan, 2006). In studies by Greenawalt and Sinkey 
(1988) and Ma (1988) it was concluded that banks used loan loss provision as long-term mechanisms to smooth 
earnings. In these studies, total loan loss provision was used as the dependent variable. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) 
focused on the behavior of loan loss provision as a function of banks’ income and other measures of business conditions 
that are likely to affect the quality of loan portfolios. Ma (1988) showed that loan loss provision is actually not strongly 
related to the actual quality of loan portfolios, but that management tends to raise loan loss provision in periods of high 
operating income and vice versa. This has also been found by Collins et al. (1995) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2004).  
“…banking supervisors love the loan loss reserve. When used as intended, it allows banks to recognize an estimated 
loss on a loan or portfolio of loans when the loss becomes likely, well before the amount of the loss can be determined 
with precision and is actually charged off. That means banks can be realistic about recognizing and dealing with credit 
problems early, when times are good, by building up a large „war chest‟ of loan loss reserves. Later, when the loan 
losses crystallize, the fortified reserve can absorb the losses without impairing capital, keeping the bank safe, sound, and 
able to continue extending credit (Dugan, 2009)”. 
So far the authors mentioned above used the total loan loss provision as dependent variable and the models used in the 
above mentioned literatures said that financial institutions can increase or decrease loan loss provisions to have less 
volatility in profitability of the banks. In this regard, financial institutions can be very much conservative during the 
peak periods and aggressive in the bad periods.  
Robb (1998) also studied whether bank managers manipulate earnings to meet market expectations about profitability 
or not. The result of the study shows that discretionary accruals are important to meet market expectations. On the other 
hand, the way of performance measurement is also important for getting reliable financial information in banks. 
Still not a single literature especially on Bangladesh financial sector comprising non-bank financial institutions has 
shown that a financial institution can overstate its accrued interest income to protect the bottom line for increase in loan 
loss provision and interest suspense account balance. Also non-bank financial institutions may increase other assets 
figure for increase in accrued interest income. In one sense it is deliberate way of performance measurement. Therefore, 
how banks and non-bank financial institutions measure performance (Robb, 1998) can play a role in reporting better 
performance. This study has tried to fill up the gap especially on non-bank financial institutions’ reporting. In this 
regard to fill the gap, the study has thrown a few questions and subsequently answered the questions with the help of 
econometric tools and techniques-  
Whether total provision increases with the increase in total loan and advances and interest suspense account balance?  
If total provision increases with the increase in total loan and advances and interest suspense account balance does the 
firm report more accrued interest income to protect the net profit? 
Does the firm increase other assets except accounts receivable for increase in accrued income where increase in other 
assets with respect to increase in accrued income in an accounting treatment? 
Therefore, based on the above questions, the required hypotheses will be- 
𝑯𝟏: Increase in total loan and advances and interest suspense account balance increase total loan loss provision. 
𝑯𝟐: Firms report more accrued interest income for increase in total loan loss provision and interest suspense account 
balance 
𝑯𝟑: The firms report more other assets except accounts receivable for increase in accrued interest income, an 
accounting treatment. 
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Figure 3. Hypothetical figure based on three hypotheses. The symbol (→) denotes increase 
To prove the hypotheses, two-time series models have been used. The first model will answer the question-Whether 
total provision increases with the increase in total loan and advances? The second model will answer- If total provision 
increases with the increase in total loan and advances, does the firm report more accrued interest income to protect the 
net profit? and does the firm increase other assets except accounts receivable for increase in accrued income where 
increase in other assets except accounts receivable with respect to increase in accrued income is an accounting 
treatment? 
Model-1:𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 …… . . (𝑀1) 
Here, 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡  𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡  are the natural logarithm of total loan loss provision, loan and advances, other 
assets except accounts receivable, and interest suspense account balance.𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3represent the percentage change in 
provision for 1% change in loan and advances, other assets except accounts receivable, and interest suspense account 
balance respectively. In the first model natural logarithm of total loan loss provision has been used as dependent 
variable and natural logarithm of loan and advances, suspense interest account balance, and other assets as independent 
variables. All variables are used in logarithmic forms to get the high magnitude of goodness of fit since logarithm will 
give more importance to the small value and less importance to the large value. Another reason to express all variables 
in logarithmic forms is there is more likely that the relationship among variables will not be linear. It is a time series 
model. The model helps to find out the impact of increase in loan and advances and interest suspense account balance 
on total provision. Increase in provision decreases the bottom line (net income). As a result, the company may 
deliberately increase accruals to increase net profit. It is notable that increase in provision is the main reason for 
deliberately increase in net income. 
Model-2: 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ……(𝑀2) 
Here 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝑡  𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼𝑡  𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡 are the natural logarithm of accrued interest and operating income. 
𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3 𝛽4 𝛽5 𝛽6 represent percentage change in accrued income for 1% change in loan and advances, other assets 
except accounts receivable, total loan loss provision, total fixed assets, operating income, and interest suspense account 
balance. In the second model natural logarithm of accrued interest has been used as dependent variable and natural 
logarithm of loan and advances, suspense interest account balance, other assets except accounts receivable, fixed assets, 
loan and advances, and operating income as independent variables. All variables are used in logarithmic forms to get the 
high magnitude of goodness of fit since logarithm will give more importance to the small value and less importance to 
the large value. Another reason to express all variables in logarithmic forms is there is more likely that the relationship 
among variables will not be linear. It is a time series model. The model helps to find out the impact of increase in loan 
loss provision and interest suspense account balance on accrued interest. Increase in provision and interest suspense 
decreases the bottom line (net income). As a result, the company may deliberately increase accruals to increase net 
profit. It is notable that increase in provision and interest suspense are the main reasons for deliberately increase in net 
income. 
4.1 Definition of the Variables Used in the Models 
4.1.1 Total Loan Loss Provision (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡) 
In financial institution like banks and non-bank financial institution, majority of the total loan loss provision comes 
Increase in interest 
suspense 
Increase in loan and 
advances 
Total loan loss provision 
Accrued interest income 
Other assets except 
accounts receivable 
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from classified loan. In financial institutions, loans are classified as- Substandard, Doubtful, and Bad and Loss. 
Non-bank financial institutions usually keep- 20%, 50%, and 100% provision on Substandard, Doubtful, and Bad and 
Loss respectively. Also non-bank financial institutions in Bangladesh keep 1% and 5% provision on Standard and 
Special Mention Account loans. Provision has a direct impact on profitability of banks. The higher the provision, the 
lower the profit. The higher the non-performing loans (Sub-standard, Doubtful, and Bad and Loss), the higher the 
provision. Therefore, financial institutions always try to minimize the provision by minimizing the non-performing 
loans. 
4.1.2 Other Assets except Accounts Receivable (𝑂𝐴𝑡) 
Most of the financial institutions report a figure in balance sheet named as other assets. Sometimes financial intuitions 
can keep accounts receivable balance in other assets. It is notable that it is very tough to identify a portion of other 
assets. Therefore, there is a chance of overstatement of total assets via other assets figure or the portion of overstated 
accrued income can be kept in other assets except accounts receivable figure. 
4.1.3 Total loan and advances (𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡) 
Total loan and advances encompasses all the outstanding balance of the loan products for example, lease loan, term loan, 
real estate finance loan, work order finance loan, corporate finance loan etc. It is a key component of assets figure 
appeared in the balance sheet and it encompasses majority part of total assets. 
4.1.4 Interest Suspense Account Balance (𝑆𝐼𝑡) 
The suspended interest of classified loans or non-performing loans (Sub-standard, Doubtful, and Bad and LOSS) is 
transferred to interest suspense account balance. The higher the interest suspension, the lower the profit. Therefore, 
financial institutions try to boost up accrued interest figure to back up the increase in interest suspense. 
4.1.5 Accrued Interest (𝐴𝐼𝑡) 
It refers all the interest income accrued in a particular period of a financial institution. The higher the accrued interest 
income, the higher the profit. Therefore, financial institutions usually try to boost up the accrued interest figure to boost 
up their profit. 
4.1.6 Fixed Assets (𝐹𝐴𝑡) 
Fixed assets refer to property, plant, and equipment. This figure appears in the balance sheet. The size of the property, 
plant, and equipment is relatively for financial institutions than that of non-financial corporation. It is notable that fixed 
assets are not key revenue generating assets for financial companies. 
4.1.7 Operating Income (𝑂𝐼𝑡) 
Operating income figure appears in the income statement. It will come out after deducting operating expenses from total 
income. No extraordinary items would be adjusted with operating income. 
5. Analysis and Findings 
At first whether unit root problem exists or not in all the variables of suggested 
models-  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡  𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡  𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡  𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡  𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼𝑡  would be checked .  In the presence of unit root 
problem, application of OLS will give spurious results. To test unit root problem, a popular test, Augmented 
Dicky-Fuller test would be used. 
5.1 ADF (Augmented Dicky-Fuller) Test 
  𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 +   𝑡 1 + ∑  𝑡  
 
  1
+ 𝜀𝑡 ……… . (𝑎1)(          ) 
  𝑡 = 𝛽0 +   𝑡 1 + ∑  𝑡  
 
  1
+ 𝜀𝑡 ……… . . (𝑎2)(             ) 
Here,  𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡. 
5.2 Hypotheses under ADF Test 
𝑯𝟎:  = 0 (𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦) 
𝑯𝒂:  < 0 (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦) 
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Table1. Summary of ADF test result without difference form 
Variables   value (With trend)   value (Without trend) Lag 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡 -0.1836 
(0.1431) 
-0.1528* 
(0.0556) 
1 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 -0.2656
* 
(0.0713) 
-0.0475 
(0.6678) 
1 
𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡 -0.0808 
(0.4348) 
-0.0702 
(0.2985) 
1 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝑡 -0.3216
** 
(0.0352) 
-0.3202*** 
(0.0067) 
1 
𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼𝑡 -0.5700
*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.5371*** 
(0.0000) 
1 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡 -0.1306 
(0.5003) 
-0.0432 
(0.2756) 
1 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡 -0.4062
*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.3601*** 
(0.0005) 
1 
Note:
***
P<0.01 denotes significant at 1% level, 
**
P<0.05 denotes significant at 5% level, 
*
P<0.10 denotes significant at 
10% level. The values under parentheses on the table refer the MacKinnon approximate Probability value. The lag has 
been selected by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian Information criteria (BIC). 
It can be said from the test result of Table 1 that the variables- 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡 , and 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡  are 
non-stationary whether the trend term has been included or not. The variables- 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡   and  𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼𝑡  are stationary 
at 5% significance level. 
Now after taking the first difference of 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡, and 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡, the ADF test results are given below: 
Table 2. Summary of ADF test result with first difference form 
Variables   value (With trend)   value (Without trend) Lag 
 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡 -0.9377
*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.9350*** 
(0.0000) 
1 
 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 -1.0879
*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.0865*** 
(0.0000) 
1 
 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡 -1.1812
*** 
(0.0000) 
 -1.0963*** 
(0.0000) 
1 
 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡 -1.4137
*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.3581*** 
(0.0000) 
1 
Note:
***
P<0.01 denotes significant at 1% level, 
**
P<0.05 denotes significant at 5% level, 
*
P<0.10 denotes significant at 
10% level. The values under parentheses on the table refer the MacKinnon approximate Probability value. The lag has 
been selected by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian Information criteria (BIC). 
It can be said from the test result of Table 2 that the variables- 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡, and 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡 are stationary at 
the first difference form whether the trend term has been included or not. Therefore, the variables - 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 , 
𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡, and 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡 are integrated at order one, I (1). 
5.3 Estimation of the Models 
At first the models have been estimated by using the OLS. After OLS, we have to prove that the models will satisfy all 
Gauss-Markov assumptions. The two key Gauss-Markov assumptions are- variance of the random error terms will 
remain constant (Homoscedasticity), 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑡) = 𝜎
2 ⍱𝑡  and there is no relationship among the random error terms 
(serial correlation), 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑡 𝜀𝑡 1) = 0 ⍱𝑡 ≠ 𝑡 − 1. If the models fail to satisfy the assumption of homoscedasticity and 
no serial correlation, the GLS would be used to estimate the models. The other assumptions are- the mean of the random 
error terms will be zero (0), 𝐸(𝜀𝑡) = 0  the random error terms will follow normal distribution (normality assumption), 
and there is no relation between explanatory variables and random error terms.  
The estimation form of the first model will be (as only 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡 is stationary): 
 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
In the first model after applying OLS, it has been observed that the 𝑅2 = 0.2069(only 20.69% of the  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡  would 
be explained by the estimated regression equation, the model is significant at 5% level validated by the result of Joint 
test probality value (<0.0004). The Adjusted 𝑅2 = 0.1768. However, after testing heteroscedasticity by Breusch- 
Pegan test, variance of the random error terms is not homoscedastic 
(𝝌𝟐 = 57.69 𝑃 > 𝝌𝟐 = 0.0000 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 under constant variance). Therefore, the GLS method 
has been applied. From the GLS, it has been found that there is no heteroscedasticity, therefore the variance of the 
random error terms is homoscedastic (𝝌𝟐 = 0.71 𝑃 > 𝝌𝟐 = 0.4007 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 under constant 
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variance). After GLS, no serial correlation has been found also validated by Lagrange-Multiplier test (maximum 5 lags 
have been used where no auto-correlation is found at each lag). The distribution of the error terms has become normal 
validated by Shaprio-Wilk test. Also there is no relationship between explanatory variables and random error terms in 
GLS. The Variance Weighted Least Square (VWLS) has been used as a form of GLS where the absolute value of 
residuals from OLS has been used as variance for weighting. Under GLS, the value of 𝑅2 = 0.9197(91.97% value of 
 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡  would be explained by the estimated regression equation under GLS) and the value of Adjusted 𝑅
2 =
0.9156. Also the model is significant which is validated by the Joint test probability value (<0.0000). The summary of 
OLS and GLS results of model one has been given below: 
Table 3. Summary of OLS and GLS results of model-1 
Variables OLS result GLS result 
 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 0.8803
*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8249*** 
(0.0000) 
 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡 0.1452
* 
(0.0690) 
0.0978*** 
(0.0000) 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡 0.0234 
(0.3370) 
0.0218*** 
(0.0000) 
Constant -0.1145 
(0.3490) 
-0.1052*** 
(0.0000) 
𝑅2 0.2029 0.9197 
Joint Test P-value 0.0004 0.0000 
Note:
***
P<0.01 denotes significant at 1% level, 
**
P<0.05 denotes significant at 5% level, 
*
P<0.10 denotes significant at 
10% level. The values under parentheses on the table refer the Probability value. 
As per GLS result (Table 3), it can be concluded that there is a positive impact of total loan and advances, other assets 
except accounts receivable, and suspended income account on total loan loss provision and the impact is significant at 
both 1% and 5% level. For 100% increase in the growth rate
3
 of total loan and advances and other assets except 
accounts receivable, the growth rate of provision would be increased by 82.49% and 9.78% respectively. 
The estimation form of the second model will be (as only 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝑡, and 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼𝑡 are stationary): 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
In the second model after applying OLS, it has been observed that the 𝑅2 = 0.4015(only 40.15% of the 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝑡  would 
be explained by the estimated regression equation, the model is significant at 5% level validated by the result of Joint 
test probability value (<0.0000). The Adjusted 𝑅2 = 0.3543. However, after testing heteroscedasticity by Breusch- 
Pegan test, variance of the random error terms is homoscedastic 
( 𝝌𝟐 = 3.74 𝑃 > 𝝌𝟐 = 0.0532 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠  under constant variance) but there exists serial 
correlation among the random error terms (validated by Lagrange multiplier test). Therefore, GLS has been applied. 
After application of GLS by estimating first order auto-correlation coefficient by Durbin Watson d-statistic, the test of 
heteroscedasticity has been applied again and no heteroscedasticity has been found but still auto-correlation exists. 
Therefore, again GLS has been applied by estimating first order auto-correlation coefficient from first attempt of GLS. 
After that again heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation have been checked. This time, no heteroscedasticity and 
auto-correlation have been found. The distribution of random error terms is normal checked by Shaprio-Wilk test. Also 
there is no correlation between explanatory variables and random error terms. The value of 𝑅2 = 0.2581 ( 25.81% of 
the variation in 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝑡would be explained by the fitted regression equation approximated by the GLS). The value of the 
Adjusted 𝑅2 = 0.1988. The model is also significant validated by the Joint test probability value (<0.0008). The 
summary of the OLS and GLS test results of model two is given below: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3
Growth rate:   𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡  is actually the growth rate of loan and advances, where,  𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 =
 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 1 =    (
    
      
). Similarly,  𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡  and  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡  are the growth rates of 
other assets and total loan loss provision. 
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Table 4. Summary of OLS and GLS results of model-2 
Variables OLS result GLS result 
 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑡 0.4453 
(0.1590) 
0.3640 
(0.2980) 
 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐴𝑡 0.2015
* 
(0.0560) 
0.0719 
(0.1470) 
 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑡 0.2796
* 
(0.0690) 
0.1653** 
(0.0280) 
 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡 0.1628 
(0.5580) 
.04447 
(0.7420) 
𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼𝑡 0.1149
*** 
(0.0000) 
.04821** 
(0.0120) 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑡 0.0782
** 
(0.0220) 
0.0785** 
(0.0410) 
Constant 5.3082*** 
(0.0000) 
2.2834*** 
(0.0000) 
𝑅2 0.4015 0.2581 
Joint Test P-value 0.0000 0.0008 
Note: 
***
P<0.01 denotes significant at 1% level, 
**
P<0.05 denotes significant at 5% level, 
*
P<0.10 denotes significant at 
10% level. The values under parentheses on the table refer the Probability value. 
As per GLS result (Table 4), total loan and advances, total other assets except account receivable, total loan loss 
provision, total fixed assets, total operating income, suspended income account have positive impact on the accrued 
interest income but only the impact of operating income, total loan loss provision, suspended income account is 
significant at 5% level. For 100% increase in operating income and suspended income accounts, accrued income would 
be increased by 11.49% and 7.82% respectively. For 100% increase in the growth rate of provision, the accrued interest 
income would be increased by 16.53%. 
It is notable that, there is no long-run relationship among the variables of both models.  
6. Conclusion 
It has been found that, increase in total loan and advances and interest suspense account balance increases the total loan 
loss provision. Increase in total loan loss provision and interest suspense increases accrued income. Increases in other 
assets except account receivable increases the accrued income but it is insignificant as per GLS result. It is very clear 
that more loan and advances are getting classified. It is not possible to have a positive relationship between interest 
suspense and accrued income. So, it can be concluded that the company is deliberately overstating accrued income to 
protect the consistency in the bottom line. It might be for the reason that the company has to fulfill a few demands of 
the stakeholders- the regulator (Bangladesh Bank as the regulator might penalize the company in terms of cancellation 
of its license), the share-holder, the depositors, and the bond-holders. Therefore, the regulators should develop more 
rigorous structures and systems to detect deliberate earnings management. The regulators should also closely monitor 
key financial variables namely total loan loss provision, net profit, interest suspense accounts balance and should 
through questions for more justification, accuracy, and reliability. 
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